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Abstract—The operation of future intelligent transportation
systems (ITSs), communications infrastructure (CI), and power
grids (PGs) will be highly interdependent. In particular, au-
tonomous connected vehicles require CI resources to operate,
and, thus, communication failures can result in non-optimality
in the ITS flow in terms of traffic jams and fuel consumption.
Similarly, CI components, e.g., base stations (BSs) can be im-
pacted by failures in the electric grid that is powering them.
Thus, malicious attacks on the PG can lead to failures in both
the CI and the ITSs. To this end, in this paper, the security of an
ITS against indirect attacks carried out through the PG is studied
in an interdependent PG-CI-ITS scenario. In the considered
scenario, an attacker can induce non-optimality in the ITS or
disrupt a particular set of streets by attacking the PG components
while remaining stealthy from the ITS administrators. To defend
against such attacks, the administrator of the interdependent
critical infrastructure can allocate backup power sources (BPSs)
at every BS to compensate for the power loss caused by the
attacker. However, due to budget limitations, the administrator
must consider the importance of each BS in light of the PG risk
of failure, while allocating the BPSs. In this regard, a rigorous
analytical framework is proposed to model the interdependencies
between the ITS, CI, and PG. Next, a one-to-one relationship
between the PG components and ITS streets is derived in order to
capture the effect of the PG components’ failure on the optimality
of the traffic flow in the streets. Moreover, the problem of BPS
allocation is formulated using a Stackelberg game framework and
the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the game is characterized.
Simulation results show that the derived SE outperforms any
other BPS allocation strategy and can be scalable in linear time
with respect to the size of the interdependent infrastructure.
Index Terms—Intelligent Transportation Systems, Communi-
cations Infrastructure, Power Grids, Interdependence, Security,
Game Theory, Stackelberg Equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) are complex sys-
tems that integrate connectivity, sensing, and autonomy to im-
prove the efficiency and the security of traditional transporta-
tion systems [1]. Different devices and sensors are connected
in an ITS to collect, share, and process data of the vehicles
and their surroundings. This information exchange requires
a reliable communication infrastructure to connect the various
vehicles and to transfer the data in real time [2]. With its ability
to connect ubiquitous devices to the Internet, the Internet of
Things (IoT) is seen as a major enabler for future ITSs [3]–[6].
As one of the main ITS components, autonomous con-
nected vehicles (ACVs) will receive control signals from the
communication infrastructure (CI)’s components such as the
base stations (BSs) through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) links.
These control signals can help to optimize the operation of the
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ITS in terms of flow, fuel consumption, and air pollution [7].
However, this reliance on wireless connectivity brings forward
new vulnerabilities because of the interdependence that exists
between the CI and the ITS [7]. For instance, an ITS attacker
can utilize the CI to jam road segments [8], deny V2X signal
services [9], tamper with traffic signals [10], and take the
control of ACVs [11].
Furthermore, since the CI is operated using power grids
(PGs), another interdependence relation comes into existence
between both infrastructure. Consequently, ITSs and PGs
will also be interdependent through the common CI. In this
regard, failures in a PG will directly affect the CI as well as
having indirect effects on the ITS. Thus, the administrator(s)
of such critical infrastructure systems must account for the
CI-PG-ITS interdependence, when securing their ITSs. This
interdependence exposes the ITS to a new set of attacks such
as bad data injection [12] or physical attacks such as tampering
the PG components [13].
CI-PG-ITS interdependence adds new constraints to the
security designs of the ITSs against cyber-physical attacks. For
example, a disruption of power delivery from the PG to the CI
can deactivate the BSs which send control packets to ACVs.
This, in turn, will disrupt the traffic flow in the ITS. Therefore,
compensating the power loss at BSs by, e.g., using backup
power sources (BPSs) [14], needs to consider the impact of
the BSs on the ITS traffic flow. However, as the available
budgets are usually limited, the administrator of an ITS will
need to prioritize the PG components, in the security design, in
light of the interdependencies between the ITS, the CI, and the
PG. However, this type of interdependencies makes designing
security solutions for such systems, highly challenging.
A. Related Works
Critical Infrastructure protection and security has recently
attracted significant attention [15] and [16]. In general, critical
infrastructure systems refer to the systems that are vital to
modern day economies and cities. Examples of such systems
include power grids, transportation systems, nuclear reactors,
communications infrastructure, water supply, and financial
services [17]. Therefore, securing and maintaining the proper
operation of such systems is of utmost priority. However,
one challenge to the security of critical infrastructure systems
stems from their interdependent nature, i.e., the functionality
of one infrastructure can depend on one or more other infras-
tructure. Therefore, the failure of one infrastructure can affect
other dependent infrastructure systems.
The security of interdependent critical infrastructure (ICI)
has thus been the focus of many recent works [18]–[22]. For
instance, the authors in [18] solved a power flow optimization
problem for interdependent PG-CI that takes into account the
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2power requirements of the CI and the impact of the CI on the
PG state estimation. The work in [19] developed a power load
control policy for PGs that mitigates the cascading failures of
interdependent PG-CI while the authors in [20] analyzed the
root cause of failures in ICIs. Furthermore, the work in [21]
studied robustness of large-scale interdependent CI-PG via a
complex network analysis. In addition, the authors in [22] and
[23] proposed a game-theoretic security solution against data
injection attacks on CI components that impact PGs.
Moreover, the security of connected vehicles has gained a
lot of attention recently due to the important role of ACVs
in the ITSs [24]–[27]. The authors in [24] proposed a deep
reinforcement learning algorithm that makes ACVs robust
against cyber attacks on the CI. The work in [25] introduced
a blockchain-based trust management mechanism for inter-
dependent CI-ITSs that takes into account the geographical
layout of the ITS networks. Furthermore, the authors in [26]
modeled the interdependencies between a CI and an ITS using
a Poisson line process. Meanwhile, in [27], the authors studied
the cyber attacks on intersection controllers of an ITS using
game theory.
However, the works in [18]–[27] did not consider stealthy
attacks on the ICI in which the attacker aims at disturbing
the ICI while staying stealthy from detection. Furthermore,
the works in [18]–[23] only studied PG-CI interdependencies
while [24]–[27] focused solely on the CI-ITS interdependen-
cies and there has been no study on the indirect but pronounced
effects of PG failures on ITSs. Although the work in [28]
considers indirect dependencies of critical infrastructure such
as gas and water networks on a CI through a PG, however,
the attack model therein did not consider any stealthiness for
the attacker.
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is, thus, a holistic
game-theoretic framework that analyzes the security of in-
terdependent PG-CI-ITS infrastructure system. The proposed
framework addresses the security of ITSs against indirect
attacks carried out through the PGs as these attacks have direct
effects on the CI and indirect effects on the ITSs. In particular
we have the following key contributions:
• We develop a novel model for capturing the interdepen-
dencies between PGs, CI, and ITSs. In particular, we an-
alytically derived the interdependence relations across the
three infrastructure: PG, CI, and ITS through formulating
a two-tier model for the ITS-CI interdependence as well
as the CI-PG interdependence.
• Combining these two interdependence models, we derive
the full PG-CI-ITS interdependence as a one-to-one map-
ping that captures the effect of PG components on the
ITS operation. These one-to-one relations can be used
by ICI administrators, when securing their interdependent
infrastructure, to prioritize the PG components based on
their ultimate effect on the ITS operation.
• We model the interactions between a stealthy attacker
and the administrator of an interdependent PG-CI-ITS
system, using game theory. In particular, we formulate
a Stackelberg game to model such interactions in which
the attacker acts as a follower whose goal is to disrupt the
ITS flow through attacking the PG components. The ICI
administrator acts as a leader whose goal is to minimize
such disruption by maintaining the optimal operation of
its CI. In this game, the defender uses the interdependence
model to allocate the BPSs to its CI to maintain the ITS
operation.
• We analytically derive the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE),
for the proposed game, which is used to characterize the
optimal attack and defense mechanisms. We show that
the derived SE strategy, for the administrator, is scalable
in linear time, and, thus it is practical for large-scale ICI
implementations.
• Through simulations, we show that the proposed SE
strategy can outperform any other security strategy for
protecting ICIs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Individual
infrastructure models and the interdependence models are
presented in Section II. The attackers stealthy model and
the optimal defense strategy are derived in Section III. The
proposed Stackelberg game between the attacker and the ICI
administrator is formulated in Section IV where the equilib-
rium solutions are also derived. Simulation results are shown
in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Individual Infrastructure Models
1) ITS Model: Consider an ITS that is modeled by a set
N of N intersections. This ITS has three main macroscopic
characteristics at each street i j (direction of movement is from
intersection i to intersection j) [29]:
• Flow, qi j(t), which is the number of ACVs passing street
i j over a given period of time (expressed in veh/h/lane)
• Density, ki j(t), which is the number of ACVs moving
in street i j at a specific instant in time (expressed in
veh/km/lane)
• Space-mean-speed, vi j(t), which is the average rate of
motion for vehicles moving in street i j (expressed in
km/h).
In an optimal ITS which takes into account minimum travel
time, maximum safety, and minimum air pollution, every street
i j is designed to have an optimal flow, q¯i j . Moreover, let
Oi and Ii be the set of streets that have flow from and to
intersection i. Then, at every intersection i, we have:
q¯ji =
∑
k∈Oi,k,j
aik q¯ik, ∀ j ∈ Ii, (1)
where aik is the portion of flow q¯ik that comes from q¯ji .
In fact, (1) captures the fact that the inflow from every
street to an intersection is divided into outflows from that
intersection. Note that we ignore u-turns at intersections since
typically u-turns are a small fraction of the through traffic. We
define an n× n network flow matrix, Q, such that the element
at row i and column j is ai j . Therefore, in order to find the
3optimal values for the traffic flow at every street we need to
solve:
I q = Qq, (2)
where I is an n×n identity matrix and q is an n×1 vector that
contains the flow rate values of all of the streets. Equation (2)
can be written as (I − Q)q = 0 or Aq = 0, where A , I − Q.
A can be proven to be under-determined since its rank is n−1
[30], [31]. Therefore, in order to solve (2), we will assume to
know the traffic flow value at least in one street and, then, we
can define an n×n−1 matrix Ai that is identical to A with the
i-th column removed. We also define ai as the i-th column of
matrix A.
Next, the values of the flow in the remaining streets can be
calculated by solving the equation:
Aiq iˆ = −aiqi, (3)
where q iˆ is an n − 1 × 1 vector containing all the values of
street flows other than street i and qi is the value of the known
street i’s traffic flow. The solution of (3) can be found by [30]:
q iˆ = −(ATi Ai)−1ATi aiqi . (4)
To this end, we can find the effect of flow deviation at the
i-th street on the entire ITS using (4) . Let δi be the flow
deviation at street i and q˜ iˆ be the flow rate of other streets
following a deviation at street i, then, we have:
q˜ iˆ = −(ATi Ai)−1ATi ai(qi − δi)
= −(ATi Ai)−1ATi aiqi + (ATi Ai)−1ATi aiδi
= q iˆ + (ATi Ai)−1ATi aiδi . (5)
Thus, the flow deviation δ iˆ on streets other than street i,
can be derived by solving δ iˆ , q˜ iˆ − q iˆ = (ATi Ai)−1ATi aiδi .
This result represents the first step in modeling the interde-
pendence in PG-CI-ITS as it allows an administrator to fully
understand the non-optimality in the flow of its entire ITS
system. Next, we study the model of the CI in light of its
connection to the ITS.
2) CI Model: In our model, the ACVs of the ITS are pow-
ered by a CI that consists of a set B of B base stations. Each
BS covers a portion of streets and communicates important
control messages to the ACVs within the covered areas. As
is customary in cellular networks, we use a hexagonal shape
to model the coverage area of every BS as shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, we can see that every BS can cover the entirety of
a street or a section of every street. Under normal operating
conditions, every BS is expected to service all the ACVs in
its coverage region.
Next, we study the operation of a BS, and its impact on
the ITS, in case there is a disruption in the delivered electrical
power. We define po
b
as the power required by every BS b,
in order to be activated [32]. Similarly, we define pt
b
as the
power required by a BS b to send control packets to 100% of
the ACVs in its cell, as shown in Fig. 2. Clearly, if the BS
received only po
b
, it will not be able to serve any ACVs.
Then, consider that BS b received a power pr
b
such that
po
b
≤ pr
b
≤ pt
b
, then, BS b will be able to send packets to only
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Fig. 3: Percentage of user coverage inside a cell as a
function of deviation on the BS received power.
a fraction of the ACVs in its cell. From Fig. 2, this fraction
of users can be given as:
xb =
pr
b
− po
b
pt
b
− po
b
, (6)
where xb is the fraction of users that can be covered by BS
b.
Next, let pa
b
be the power deviation at BS b such that pa
b
=
pt
b
−pr
b
. Then the relationship between the percentage of users
that receive packets from BS b and the power deviation pa
b
can
be shown as in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3, we can see that, if the
supplied power deviates by more than pt
b
− p0
b
, then, the BS
cannot send packets to any of the users.
To this end, the previous analysis of the CI allows us to
determine the percentage of the affected ACVs in case of
4power disruption. Next, we study the the operation of the PG
in light of its connections to the CI.
3) PG Model: The BSs in our CI are powered by a PG.
In particular, we model this PG by a graph P = {V, E}
in which V is the set of power nodes and E is the set of
connection lines between these nodes. We consider two types
of power nodes: Power generators and loads. Note that, in a
typical power grid, there can be other types of nodes such as
transmission units and substations. However, we do not model
these units explicitly as nodes in the graph G as they do not
have direct effect on the communication network.
Since we are interested in the power received at the BSs, we
consider them in more detail as being load nodes in the power
grid. The effect of the BSs failure can be included as part of
the load nodes failure. Thus, let G be the set of G generators,
L be the set of all load nodes, and Q be the set of Q non-BS
loads. Thus, we have L = Q ∪ B, where B is the set of base
stations as defined earlier. We also have V = G∪L as the set
of all nodes include all the generators and all the load nodes.
Since we are interested in studying the dependency between
the PG and the CI, it is important to highlight the effect of
power generation failures on CI. In a typical PG, electricity
is generated to match the power consumption which is known
as demand-response [33]. As it is hard and inefficient to store
electricity, the power grid uses a means of communication
to organize the generation capacity of each power generation
unit. This management is also useful in case one generator fails
so that its planned load can be shifted to other generation units
to meet the power consumption demand [34]. The relation
between the power grid failures and the CI, is studied next.
B. Interdependence Analysis
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the interdependencies in our system.
From Fig. 4 we can see that the power grid provides the
essential electricity required for the proper operation of the
BSs in the CI. The BSs in turn use this power to transmit
the control signals to the ITS. Therefore, in case a failure
occurs in any of the power lines, some BSs might not receive
their required power. As a result, they will fail to cover some
portions of the ITS. Consequently, some ACVs in the ITS will
not receive the control packets from the CI which will lead to
a non-optimal traffic flow in the ITS.
In such a scenario, it can be said that the operation of the
CI is directly dependent on the functionality of the PG while
the operation of the ITS is indirectly dependent on the PG,
through the CI. As a result, next, we propose a two-tier model
to capture the interdependence within a PG-CI-ITS system. In
particular, we will use the empirical, agent-based and flow-
based methods to model the interdependencies between the
ITS and CI in the first tier. Then, we will use the a network-
based model to study the interdependence between the CI and
the PG [35], in the second tier.
1) Interdependence of ITS and CI: In our ITS model, every
street or every section of each street is covered by a specific
BS. This makes the ITS vulnerable against possible failures in
the CI whenever a portion of BSs are either deactivated or do
not have enough power to send control packets to all of the
ACVs in streets. In this case, the flow at every street might
deviate from its optimal value. In particular, if a BS b can
only send control packets to a fraction x of its covered street
i, then the flow reduction at street i will be −x sibli δ, where
sib is the length of street i covered by BS b, li is the length
of street i, and δ is a fixed number indicating the difference
between the flow of a street that is 1 km long before and after
deviation.
Such flow deviation can propagate forward and backward as
time goes and can essentially affect the entire ITS. Thus, we
define a matrix C in which each element at row i and column
b, cib equals:
cib =
{
sib
li
if BS b covers sib of street i,
0 otherwise.
Then, if the received power at a BS b is reduced by x, such
that po
b
≤ x ≤ pt
b
, then its effect on the flow of street i is
− x
pt
b
−po
b
sib
li
δ, and, thus, the flow deviation will propagate to
the entire ITS which can be derived using (5) by:
δb
iˆ
= (ATi Ai)−1ATi ai
x
pt
b
− po
b
sib
li
δ. (7)
Then, if we concatenate -1 at the i-th row of (ATi Ai)−1ATi ai
and shift all the rows after row i one row down, we will
construct a new vector ebi that has n rows and shows the effect
of failure of BS b on the ITS through direct impact on street
i.
Therefore, the total impact of a power deviation x at BS b
on ITS can be written as follows:
eb(x) = ©­«
∑
i∈Sb
ebi
sib
li(ptb − pob)
ª®¬︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
zb
δx = zbδx, ∀x ∈ [0, ptb − pob] ,
(8)
where set Sb is the set of all the streets covered by BS b. In
(8), the i-th element zbi of z
b captures the one-to-one impact
of BS b on the street i.
Note that, in order to compare the value of every BS with
that of other BSs, we can use the L1-norm of zb which we
define it as zb , |zb |, such that a BS with higher zb value
will have higher impact on the ITS.
2) Interdependence of CI and PG: The BSs must be
connected to the PG to obtain the electricity required for their
operation. Thus, we model each BS as a load node in the
power grid. As discussed earlier, these BSs need certain power
requirements in order for them to operate properly otherwise
they will fail [32]. These power requirements can be satisfied
by the power generators that are connected to the BS using
transmission lines.
To study the effect of a power generator failure on its
connected BSs, we consider the example in Fig. 1. In Fig.
1, power sources are represented using circles while the BSs
are represented using hexagons. We notice that some BSs
can receive electricity directly from multiple generators or
indirectly through the transmission lines from other generators.
Similarly, each generator is directly connected to some BSs (as
loads) and also to the rest of the grid using transmission lines.
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Fig. 4: An illustration of the interdependencies between ITS, CI, and PG.
Modeling the exact behavior of power generators failure
is a complex process as it can involve multiple failures in
the grid known as cascading failures [19]. However, in this
work, we are concerned only with the effect on the BSs. We
evaluate each power generation based on its failure effect on
the connected BSs. The failure here refers to the inability
of the power generator to produce the electricity either fully
or partially due to any disruptive events such as cyber or
physical attacks. In the following, we explain the procedure
of evaluating the power generators in case of full failure, i.e.,
no electricity generation. Partial failures can be modeled in a
similar way by considering the affected BSs.
Let T be a B × G matrix such that the entity at row b
and column i of T which we define as tg
b
is a value in [0, 1]
that indicates the portion of pr
b
received at BS b from power
source g. Therefore, if a power source g is not connected to
BS b, then tg
b
= 0. When a BS is connected to more than
one generator, we will have
∑
g∈G t
g
b
= 1, ∀b ∈ B, i.e., the
summation over all the connected generators will equal the full
power received at a single BS, from these generators. Next,
we explain the procedure that an attacker can use to exploit
the interdependence in order to perform its stealthy attacks.
III. INTERDEPENDENT PG-CI-ITS UNDER ATTACK
A. Stealthy Attack Model
Consider an adversary who aims at disrupting the operation
of the ITS by attacking the PG components. Such an attack
can target either the generators or the power lines. When the
attacker damages a generator, that generator will no longer
supply power at full capacity. In addition, the attacker can
specifically reduce the power supply at any line by damaging
the infrastructure. Doing so, the goal of the attacker can
include disrupting the flow of a specific street or the entire
ITS. However, defining such a specific goal for the attacker
might not be always possible since the attacker may not have
access to all the PG components.
Although a higher disruption at the PG will cause a higher
flow deviation at the ITS, it will on the other hand expose
the attacker to be detected with higher chance. Therefore, we
introduce the stealthiness level to represent the level at which
the attacker risks to be detected, i.e., a risk averse attacker
will adopt a higher stealthiness level, and, thus it will perform
less attacks in order not to be detected. On the other hand, a
risk tolerant attacker will adopt a lower stealthiness level by
performing a large scale attack despite the higher chance of
being detected. Here, we define the stealthiness level based
on the location of the attack as each location can cause a
different degree of damage to the system while having a
different chance of detection. In particular, we define three
levels of stealthiness: a) at the power source level, b) at the
power line level, and c) at the BS level.
Let pa
gb
be the power deviation caused by the attacker at
the line connecting power source g to BS b. Then, at a power
source g level, the probability of being detected can be defined
as:
pig =
∑
b∈B pagb∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
, (9)
where the numerator is the total power deviation by the
attacker at power source g, and the denominator is the total
generated power by the power source g in a safe scenario.
Similarly, the probability of attack detection at the power
line level connecting a power source g to a BS b can be defined
as:
pigb =
pa
gb
tg
b
pt
b
. (10)
Moreover, the probability of staying stealthy at a BS b can
be defined as:
pib =
∑
g∈G pagb
pt
b
− po
b
, (11)
where the numerator is the total power deviation at BS b and
the denominator is the required power for covering 100% of
the users in BS b’s cell.
The probabilities of detection defined in (9), (10), or (11)
will be utilized in Section IV to study the attacker’s behavior
when interacting with a defender adopting our defense strategy
discussed next.
B. Defense Strategy
As a countermeasure, the administrator of the ICI, the
defender hereinafter, can allocate BPSs at every BS in order to
6compensate for the power loss at the BS. However, in practice,
due to the budget limitation and different impact levels of each
BS on the ITS, the administrator must allocate a different
amount of BPSs at every BS. Let Pd be the total available
amount of BPSs1 for the defender and pd
b
be the allocated
BPSs at BS b, then we will have
∑
b∈B pdb ≤ Pd , i.e., the
defender does need to allocate all the BPSs. Therefore, the
total power deviation at BS b can be written as
∑
g∈G pagb−pdb .
The defender can then evaluate the outcome from allocating
each BPS by evaluating the improvement in the ITS due to
the compensated power from the BPS. However, the defender’s
outcome from allocating a BPS will depend on the attacker’s
choice of PG component. Thus, next we study the outcomes
for both players in presence of these interactions.
C. Attacker-Defender Interactions
We propose to define the defender’s payoff from allocating
the BPSs at BSs, as a function in both players’ actions, as the
negative of total flow deviation at the ITS using (8) as follows:
ud(pd, pa) = −
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pagb − pdb
ª®¬ , (12)
where pd and pa are the strategy vectors of the defender
and the attacker, respectively. Here, the defender’s strategy pd
represents the allocated BPSs at every BS, while the attacker’s
strategy pa represents the targeted power deviations at every
power line. Recall that zb is given by (8), and it represents
the one-to-one impact of the BSs on the ITS. We note that, in
(12), we dropped δ from (8) as it is a constant value and will
not impact the strategy design.
We can rearrange (12) as follows:
ud(pd, pa) = −

∑
g∈G
∑
b∈B
zbpagb −
∑
b∈B
zbpdb
 . (13)
Since the defender and the attacker have opposing goals, the
defender’s loss is considered as the attacker’s gain. Therefore,
the attacker’s payoff will be the negative of the defender’s
payoff, as follows:
ua(pd, pa) =
∑
g∈G
∑
b∈B
zbpagb −
∑
b∈B
zbpdb . (14)
However, (14) represents the general outcome of the attacker
in case the attack is overt and no stealthiness was adopted.
When an attacker performs a stealthy attack, its payoff will
depend on the level of stealthiness. In this case, its payoff can
be given by:
ua(pd, pa) =
∑
g∈G
∑
b∈B
zbpagb(1 − pix) −
∑
b∈B
zbpdb, x ∈ {g, gb, b},
(15)
where x represents the stealthiness level at the power source, at
the power line, or the at BS. Thus, we can define three different
payoff functions based on the three levels os stealthiness
1Since the BPSs can be designed to have any desired storage capacity we
consider Pd and pd
b
to take any positive value.
defined in Section III-A. First, for the power source level
stealthiness, we substitute (9) in (15), so we get:
uaG(pa, pd) =
∑
g∈G
∑
b∈B
zbpagb
(
1 −
∑
b∈B pagb∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
−
∑
b∈B
zbpdb .
(16)
From (16), we can see that large values for each pa
gb
will yield a larger flow deviation in the ITS. However, this
will result in a higher probability of detection. Therefore, the
attacker must choose pa such that
∑
b∈B pagb∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G.
Similarly, the attacker’s payoff while seeking to remain
stealthy at every power line level can be calculated by substi-
tuting (10) in (15), so we get:
uaL(pa, pd) =
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pagb
(
1 −
pa
gb
tg
b
pt
b
)
− pdb
ª®¬ . (17)
In (17), we can see that, in order to stay stealthy, the attacker
must choose pa such that
pa
gb
t
g
b
pt
b
≤ 1.
Finally, for the case in which the attacker wants to stay
stealthy at the BS level, the payoff function can be calculated
by substituting (11) in (15), so we get:
uaB(pa, pd) =
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pagb − pdb
ª®¬
(
1 −
∑
g∈G pagb
pt
b
− po
b
)
. (18)
As we can see from (12), (16), (17), and (18), the payoffs
are functions of both of the strategies of the defender and
the attacker which motivates a game-theoretic approach [36].
Moreover, since BPSs will first be implemented and then the
attacker will attack the PG, thus, the defender must choose
its best strategy before seeing the attacker’s strategy. This
scenario can be properly modeled using Stackelberg games
[36] in which the defender is the leader and the attacker is
the follower. Note that, this hierarchical model of the players
is common to many noncooperative Stackelberg games when
addressing security problems e.g., [37] and [38].
IV. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
We formulate a single-leader, single-follower Stackelberg
game [36], between the defender and the attacker. The de-
fender (leader), will act first by choosing pd to maximize
its payoff. The attacker, having seen the attacker’s allocated
BPSs, will engage in a noncooperative game by choosing pa
to maximize its payoff. In fact, the final flow at the ITS is
a function of the defender and the attacker’s strategies. One
suitable concept to find the optimal strategies, and solve the
proposed game, for both the attacker and the defender is that
of a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) as defined next.
Definition 1. A strategy profile
(
pd
∗
, pa
∗ )
is a Stackelberg
equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
uax (pa
∗
, pd
∗ ) ≥ uax (pa, pd
∗ ), (19)
ud(pd∗, pa∗ ) = max
pd
ud(pd, pa∗ ), (20)
7where x can be G, B, or L depending on the desired level of
stealthiness.
According to this definition, the defender needs to choose
a strategy that maximizes its outcome based on the attacker’s
optimal response. Therefore, in order to find the SE we can
proceed by backward induction. First, we need to derive
the values of pa that maximize the attacker’s payoff. Then,
we will find the defender’s strategy at SE by plugging in
the attacker’s maximizer strategy into the defender’s payoff
function and finding the maximizer strategy of the defender.
In what follows, we derive the SE for the three stealthiness
levels.
A. Stealthiness at the Power Source Level
In this case, the attacker’s problem of finding the values of
pa that maximize its payoff can be formulated according to
(16) as follows:
max
pa
∑
g∈G
∑
b∈B
zbpagb
(
1 −
∑
b∈B pagb∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
−
∑
b∈B
pdb . (21)
s.t.
∑
b∈B
pagb ≤
∑
b∈B
tg
b
ptb ∀g ∈ G. (22)
We can assume that the power loss at the generator is
equally distributed at every power line connected to it. Thus,
we can find the SE by considering the values for pa
gb
are equal
for every g ∈ G. The following theorem derives the SE for
this case.
Theorem 1. The attacker’s strategy at the SE is: pa∗
gb
=∑
b∈Bg t
g
b
pt
b
2 |Bg | , where |Bg | is the number of BSs which are
connected to the power source g and the defender’s strategy
at the SE is the solution of the following linear program:
max
pd
zbpdb, (23)
s.t.
∑
b∈B
pdb ≤ Pd, (24)
0 ≤ pdb ≤
∑
g∈G
pa
∗
gb, ∀b ∈ B. (25)
Proof. Considering equal values for pa
gb
≥ pag, ∀b ∈ Bg for
every power source g, we can rewrite (21) as:
max
pa
∑
g∈G
(
pag
∑
b∈B
zb
) (
1 − p
a
g |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
−
∑
b∈B
pdb . (26)
We can solve this maximization problem by taking the
partial derivative of (26) with respect to pag, ∀g ∈ G and
setting it to 0. Then we have:
∂
∑
g∈G
(
pag
∑
b∈B zb
) (
1 − p
a
g |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
∂pag
− ∂
∑
b∈B pdb
∂pag
= 0.
which is equivalent to:
∂
∑
g∈G
(
pag
∑
b∈B zb
) (
1 − p
a
g |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
∂pag
= 0.
taking the derivatives of the individual terms:∑
b∈B
zb
(
1 − p
a
g |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
+
(
pag
∑
b∈B
zb
) (
− |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
= 0.
then we have:(
1 − p
a
g |Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
= pag
(
|Bg |∑
b∈B t
g
b
pt
b
)
.
from which we can get the optimal strategy as:
pa
∗
g =
∑
b∈Bg t
g
b
pt
b
2|Bg |
We note that this solution satisfies (22), so it represents a
valid solution to the problem in (21).
Next, in order to find the defender’s strategy at the SE, we
first plug in the strategy of the attacker at the SE into (12) as
follows:
ud(pd, pa∗ ) = −
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pa
∗
gb − pdb
ª®¬ . (27)
Since the first term in (27) does not depend on pd , then
the defender’s problem simplifies to (23). However, since
the allocated BPS at every BS cannot exceed the attacker’s
deviation at the same BS, we add the constraints in (25) which
must be satisfied by the defender. 
Theorem 1 shows that there exists only one SE for the case
in which the attacker wants to stay stealthy at the power source
level since the linear program in (23) will yield only one
solution. To solve (23), we can use known techniques such
as the simplex method [39].
B. Stealthiness at the Power Line Level
In this case, the attacker’s problem can be formulated
according to (17) as follows:
max
pa
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pagb
(
1 −
pa
gb
tg
b
pt
b
)
− pdb
ª®¬ (28)
s.t. pagb ≤ tgb ptb, ∀g ∈ G,& b ∈ Bg . (29)
Next, we derive the optimal strategy of the attacker that
maximizes its payoff, plug it into the defender’s strategy, and,
then, derive the maximizer strategy of the defender, similar to
the case of power source level.
Theorem 2. At the power line level, the SE of the game
occurs when the attacker plays the strategy is: pa
∗
gb
=
t
g
b
pt
b
2
and the defender plays the strategy given by the solution of
the following linear program:
max
pd
zbpdb, (30)
s.t.
∑
b∈B
pdb ≤ Pd, (31)
0 ≤ pdb ≤
∑
g∈G
tg
b
pt
b
2
, ∀b ∈ B. (32)
8Proof. The proof follows a similar procedure to the proof of
Theorem 1, where we first take the partial derivative of (28)
with respect to pa
gb
and setting it equal to zero. Then we can
find the maximizer strategy of the attacker which is pa
∗
gb
=
t
g
b
pt
b
2 .
By plugging this value into the payoff function of the
defender in (12), we end up having the linear program in (30)
and the condition in (32) comes from the fact that the allocated
BPSs at every BS cannot exceed the power deviation caused
by the attacker at each BS. 
Theorem 2 shows that, our game will admit a unique SE
for the case in which the attacker tries to stay stealthy at the
power line level.
C. Stealthiness at the BS Level
In this case, the attacker’s problem can be formulated
according to (18) as follows:
max
pa
∑
b∈B
zb
©­«
∑
g∈G
pagb − pdb
ª®¬
(
1 −
∑
g∈G pagb
pt
b
− po
b
)
(33)
s.t.
∑
g∈G
pagb ≤ ptb − pob, ∀b ∈ B. (34)
The following theorem derives the SE for this case.
Theorem 3. At the SE, the defender’s strategy is the solution
of the following linear program:
max
pd
zbpdb, (35)
s.t.
∑
b∈B
pdb ≤ Pd, (36)
0 ≤ pdb ≤
∑
g∈G
pt
b
− po
b
2
, ∀b ∈ B, (37)
while the attacker’s SE strategy is any pa
∗
, such that∑
g∈G pagb =
pd
∗
b
+pt
b
−po
b
2 , ∀b ∈ B.
Proof. In order to find the maximizer strategy of the attacker,
we define pa
b
,
∑
g∈G pagb . In this case, the attacker’s problem
simplifies to:
max
pa
∑
b∈B
zb
(
pab − pdb
) (
1 − p
a
b
pt
b
− po
b
)
(38)
s.t. pab ≤ ptb − pob, ∀b ∈ B. (39)
We can now take the first order partial derivative of (38)
with respect to pa
b
and set it equal to 0, similar to Theorem
1. Then, the maximizer value for the attacker is derived as
pd
b
+pt
b
−po
b
2 , ∀b ∈ B.
By substituting this value into the defender’s payoff func-
tion, we end up having the linear program in (35). How-
ever, here, we note that pa
b
≤ pt
b
− po
b
should be satisfied
which yields to the condition in (37). This linear program
has a unique solution, however, since any solution of pa
b
,∑
g∈G pa
∗
gb
is an SE, thus, there exists infinitely many SEs for
this case. 
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Fig. 5: Effect of the power deviation on the ITS flow.
Theorem 3 shows that, for the case in which the attacker
tries to stay stealthy at the BS level, there are infinitely many
SEs for the game. However, all of these strategies will yield
the same payoff for the defender and the attacker.
Finally, we can see that all the derived SEs are the solutions
of linear programs. Therefore, the proposed game model and
its solution(s) can be solved in linear time with respect to the
size of the ICI. This property makes the proposed solution
scalable and, hence, it is applicable to large-scale ICIs.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a grid model for the ITS in
which the lengths of streets and the numbers of intersections
in the x and y directions are equal. We consider hexagonal
models for the communication network’s cells and we spread
a number of power sources in the studied world where their
locations are drawn according to a 2-D uniform distribution.
The number of BSs that are connected to the power sources
is also drawn according to a uniform distribution. For every
simulation, we construct a new flow matrix A that satisfies the
condition in (1). In addition, we consider that for all of the
BSs, pt
b
= 2po
b
.
First, in Fig. 5, we show the impact of deviation of the
power generation of all power sources on the flow deviation of
the ITS. We can see that, as the percentage of power reduction
increases, the flow deviation linearly increases until when the
power is reduced to half of the total power generation. At this
point pr
b
= po
b
, which means that the received power can only
activate the BS but is not enough to send control packets to
ACVs. That is why after 50% reduction the flow deviation
stays constant.
Fig. 6 illustrates the effect of the scale of the ITS on the
SE strategies and the flow deviation. In this scenario, we keep
both the number of power sources and the radius of cells
constant. However, the number of the cells will increase as
the scale of the ITS grows. In Fig. 6, we also compare the
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Fig. 6: Effect of the ITS scale on the traffic flow deviation
for different levels of stealthiness.
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Fig. 7: Effect of the cell radius on the power flow deviation.
three types of stealthiness level that are power source level
(Fig. 6a), power line level (Fig. 6b), and BS level (Fig. 6c).
First, we can see that in all the cases, the increase in the scale
of the ITS, represented by the number of the intersections in
each direction, will increase the interdependence of the ITS
on the CI thus causing higher flow deviations on the ITS. The
upper line in each figure represents the case of zero Pd , i.e., no
BPSs are used, and hence, the highest deviation. As the values
of the compensated power increase, we can see a reduction in
the flow deviation, in all the cases.
From Fig. 6, we can also see that on average, power line
level stealthiness, in Fig. 6b, can cause higher flow deviation
than power source level stealthiness, Fig. 6a, and, than, BS
level stealthiness, Fig. 6c. That means the interdependent PG-
CI-ITS infrastructure is more sensitive to power line attacks
than the other types of attacks. We can also in Fig. 6, that
compensating the power by using BPSs at the BS level has
higher positive effect on reducing the deviations in the flow.
This can be seen from Fig. 6c as the gap between the lines
representing flow deviations due to additional Pd are wider
than that in Figs. 6a and 6b. Therefore, at the value of Pd =
250 watts, for instance, the flow deviation is the minimum for
all number of intersections in Fig. 6c.
Fig. 7 shows the effect of the cell coverage radius on the
final flow deviation. From Fig. 7, we can see that, in general,
an increase in the cell size reduces the flow rate deviation.
However, for the case in which the cell radius is 1.2 km there
is a small increase in the average flow rate deviation, for most
of the cases, compared to when the cell radius is 1.1 km. This
is because, for this value, the increase in the radius means that
fewer BSs are needed to cover the ITS. This, in turn, increases
the portion of the ITS that is covered by each BS allowing the
failures of the BSs to cause a higher deviation in the average
flow rate of the ITS. However, this increase is limited due to
the fact that each BS becomes connected to more generators
which makes the BSs less vulnerable to power deviations. Note
that, in Fig. 7, increasing the cell size over 1.2 km does not
reduce the number of BSs, and thus, the flow rate deviation
returned to normal behavior as before the value of 1.2 km.
Moreover, Fig. 7 shows that our proposed Stackelberg
allocation strategy can reduce the flow deviation by 19%, 22%,
10
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Fig. 8: Attack on all of the power sources.
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Fig. 9: Attack on only one power source.
and 37% for stealthiness levels at power source, power line,
and BS respectively, when the value of Pd = 50 watts. This
is represented by the gap between the lines representing the
same stealthiness level when the BPSs are allocated per the
optimal SE equilibrium in Section IV.
Figs. 8 and 9 show the effect of the number of power sources
on the flow deviation. In Fig. 8, we study the case in which the
attacker performs an attack on all of the power sources, while
in Fig. 9, we show the case in which the attacker performs
its attack on only one of the power sources. From Fig. 8,
we observe that the flow deviation does not change as the
number of generators increase. This due to the fact that, by
adding more power sources, the attacker can still attack the
newly added power sources and, thus, the new power sources
would not compensate the power loss at the BSs. Note that,
this case might be unrealistic in the sense that even powerful
attackers might not have the capacity to attack all the power
sources in the PG. However, we show this case to highlight
the difference when the attacker attack just few generators. In
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Fig. 10: Comparison between the SE and equal allocations.
particular, we consider the case of attacking just one generator
in Fig. 9. From Fig. 9 we can see that, when the number of
power sources increases, the flow deviation becomes smaller,
when the number of the generators increase. This is because
the ITS can now benefit from the added power sources as they
are not targeted by the attacker.
Finally, in Fig. 10, we compare our proposed SE allocation
with an allocation strategy in which the BPSs are equally
distributed at every BS. We can see from Fig. 10 that our
proposed SE can reduce the flow deviation by up to 40%
compared to the case of equal allocation. Moreover, when
the attacker is not stealthy, the equal BPS distribution cannot
defend the ITS against the attacker compared to the SE
allocation which is shown to be effective in reducing the flow
deviation. The other stealthiness levels exhibit similar behavior
where the SE allocations outperform the equal allocations in
all cases. We also can see from Fig. 10 that when the attacker’s
goal is to stay stealthy at the power lines, it can cause higher
flow deviations compared to the other two stealthiness levels,
which corroborates the results in Fig. 6.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the security of interdependent
PG-CI-ITS infrastructure. We have modeled each infrastruc-
ture where it was shown that there is a strong interdependence
between the ITS, the CI, and the PG infrastructure. Using
these individual models, we have derived a rigorous one-to-
one interdependence relation that can map the effect of power
loss at the PG components on the ITS traffic flow. Then,
we have defined the possible ways in which an attacker can
perform a stealthy attack on the interdependent infrastructure.
In particular, three levels of attacker stealthiness have been
considered that can occur at the power source, the power lines,
and at the BS level. In order to defend against any these types
of attacks, we have proposed a Stackelberg game to model
the interactions between the attacker and the infrastructure
administrator, as the defender. We have analytically derived
the Stackelberg solution for the different levels of stealthiness
11
for the attacker. This Stackelberg solution can be used by the
defender to strategically allocate its available BPSs at every
BS. We have also shown that the solutions of the proposed
game are scalable as they can be reached in linear time with
respect to the size of ICI which makes the analysis practical
for large-scale ICIs. Results have shown that the proposed
Stackelberg allocation outperforms other strategy selection
techniques and, in particular, can reduce the flow deviation at
ITS up to 40% compared to an equal BPS allocation strategy.
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